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Abstract
This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive
schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incen-
tives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual charac-
teristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that
fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes
information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in
which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical pre-
dictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation
and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this
is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.
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1 Introduction
In the last years a large debate has focused on the possible ways to improve school-
ing achievement at every level of education. The relevance of this goal is not dis-
putable, since education contributes to the accumulation of human capital, the de-
velopment of societies and it is considered as one of the main channels for the
reduction of inequality. Recent studies have addressed this goal measuring the im-
pact of monetary incentives both on input (e.g. subsidizing the purchase of learning
supports) and on output (e.g. giving money based on grades, or conditional on pass-
ing the exam). In this paper we take a different approach and we study the effect
of different grading rules on schooling achievement. In particular, we do not use
monetary rewards to incentivize students’ effort whilst we assign them to different
incentive schemes: a tournament, a piece rate and a scheme that promotes coopera-
tion. The analysis is performed on a sample of students enrolled in a undergraduate
course in econometrics at the University of Bologna (Italy).
The design of the field experiment is based on a theoretical model that contem-
plates three different incentive schemes. As a benchmark we consider the effect on
effort of a piece rate reward. Then we analyze two alternatives: a tournament that
fosters competition among matched students and a cooperative scheme in which
they can share information and collaborate. The model suggests a weak ordering
between the three: in a competitive environment individual performance should be
weakly higher than in the benchmark and effort under the benchmark should be
weakly higher than in the cooperative scheme. We also show that the detrimental
effect of cooperative incentives on effort does not depend on the specific shape of
the distribution of types in the population, while the magnitude – but not the sign
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– of the effects of a competitive incentive scheme depends on the shape of this
distribution. To test these theoretical predictions, we randomly assign students to
the treatments and we adopt a between-subjects design, i.e. each subject is only
exposed to a single incentive scheme.
Data confirm the theoretical predictions in the full sample. Moreover, we show
that an important difference emerges between genders: promoting competition ap-
pears to have a strong positive effect on the exerted effort only for males. In con-
trast, promoting cooperation reduces effort with respect to the case where students
can neither compete nor cooperate, but this effect is not statistically significant for
both genders. These findings are in line with the literature on how competition af-
fects behaviour depending on gender (see for example Gneezy, Leonard, and List
2009) and provide an interesting comparison with respect to the result of Angrist
and Lavy (2009) who find that monetary incentives improve performance especially
on girls. We depart from this branch of the literature, complementing the results
obtained through monetary incentive, by focusing on non-monetary ones since they
represent a relatively cheap way to increase student’s effort1.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the related literature
(Section 1) we describe and discuss in detail our experimental design (Section 2). In
Section 3, we present a simple model, and derive the theoretical predictions which
will serve as a reference for the analysis of the experimental data, presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes, and presents possible extensions of this research.
1Studies on monetary incentives proved to be successful in improving students’ performance but
the cost of inducing higher effort is not negligible. In a study conducted in the New York City school
system $600 have been awarded for each passing grade, the Baltimore City Public School District has
paid up to $110 to improve scores on state graduation exams and similar programs in the US award
up to $500 for each exam passed.
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2 Related Literature
We provide a brief review of the literature to highlight our contribution with respect
to previous theoretical and empirical work.
On the general issue of how to foster students’ effort and school achievement
through explicit incentive schemes, several papers explore the role of pecuniary-
based incentives. Among those, Blimpo (2010) represents the closest study to our
experiment. Analysing data from a field experiment in Benin with a pool of 100
secondary schools, he studies whether individual or different kind of team incen-
tives can lead to a higher students’ school performance. He considers three treat-
ments. In the first treatment, each student obtained an individual monetary reward
if and only if his or her performance exceeded a minimal threshold at the final
exam. In the second treatment, participants were randomly assigned to teams of
four students and each team-member received a monetary reward depending on the
average team performance, if and only if all the team-members achieved a target
performance level. Finally, in the third treatment, participants were randomly as-
signed to teams of four students but in this case only the components of the three
top-performer teams were awarded with a monetary prize. Blimpo (2010) finds
that the individual based incentive scheme with cut-off target is most effective for
students at an intermediate performance level: at the lower tail of the skills distribu-
tion, students reduce effort, probably because they perceive the target out of reach;
at the higher tail of the distribution, students know that they are able to get the
prize without any extra effort, thus the average impact of such incentives is smaller.
When teams are evaluated according to the average performance of the group con-
ditionally on the achievement of a minimal performance target (2nd treatment),
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students across all levels of ability are positively affected: the effort exerted by
the different team-mates is pushed toward the target. The tournament scheme (3rd
treatment) yields the most beneficial effects: it induces all the teams to work harder
as students exposed to this treatment do not have any prior information about the
quality and the skills of their competitors in the other teams.
Recent papers consider tournaments at school with financial rewards. Kremer,
Miguel, and Thornton (2009) focus their study on the evaluation of a merit schol-
arship programme dedicated only to female students in an elementary school in
Kenya. They observe a substantial increase in the exams scores: in particular girls
with low pre-test scores, who were unlikely to win a scholarship (and actually did
not get it), reported positive and significant gains in terms of higher school perfor-
mance. De Paola and Scoppa (2010) studied the effectiveness of monetary incen-
tive schemes in enhancing students’ performance using a randomized experiment
involving undergraduates in an Italian University. Students participating in the ex-
periment were assigned to three different groups: a high reward group, a low reward
group and a control group. Rewards were assigned according to a ranking rule to
the top performing students in each treated group. The authors report that financial
rewards contributed to increase the students’ performance: a very strong reaction
emerged among high ability students who were likely to win the contest, while no
significant effect was observed for low ability students that have fewer chances to
win the tournament competition. Along the same lines, Leuven, Oosterbeek, and
van der Klaauw B. (forth.) present results of a randomized field experiment in
which freshman students at the Amsterdam University had the opportunity to earn
financial rewards for passing all first year requirements. Their findings provide ev-
idence that high ability students perform significantly better when assigned to re-
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warded groups. On the contrary low ability students’ outcome decreases if assigned
to rewarded groups. The small aggregate average effect that they observe is there-
fore the sum of a positive effect for high ability students and a negative off-setting
effect for low ability students. These previous results highlight the importance of
controlling for students’ ability and individual characteristics when assessing the
impact of incentive schemes on their school performance.
A recent study has Fryer (2010) addressed this goal measuring the impact of
monetary incentives both on input (e.g. subsidizing the purchase of learning sup-
ports) and on output (e.g. giving money based on grades, or conditional on passing
the exam). Results show that incentives can raise achievement among even the
poorest minority students in the lowest performing schools if the incentives are
provided on ”‘inputs”’. Incentives focused on ”‘output”’ result to be much less
effective.
Among the authors who studied the effects of financial incentives on ”‘output”’,
some focused specifically on gender differences. Angrist and Lavy (2009) evaluate
the effectiveness of financial rewards on the achievement of Israeli students using
a randomized experiment providing monetary awards to students who obtain the
university admission. The authors show how the program led to significant effects
for girls but not for boys. Differences in gender-scheme interaction emerge also
from the field experiment by Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009). In this study,
researchers randomly assigned a sample of students enrolled in a Canadian univer-
sity to one of three different treatments: the first group was provided with a set of
support services (e.g. tutoring); the second group was offered financial rewards for
good academic scores; the third one was offered a combination of support services
and monetary incentives according to the academic performance. The results of the
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experiment show that while males did not react to any of the treatments, females
improved significantly their academic performance when monetary incentives were
provided.
While females appear to react more than males to monetary incentives awarded
for achieving an exogenously given target, incentive schemes based on competition
may yield opposite effects. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) found that
males are more prone to engage in competition than females and in general males’
performance increases more than the females’ one when subjects are exposed to
a competitive setting. Similarly, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that, when
given the opportunity to choose between a piece-rate payment scheme or a tour-
nament, men select the tournament twice more frequently than women, suggesting
that women tend to avoid competition when they have the chance to do so. Azmat
and Iriberri (2010) find that, even when the incentive scheme is based solely on the
subject’s performance, providing information about the relative performance pro-
motes higher levels of effort among men, but not among women. We explore the
role of gender, and we find that males tend to respond to incentives as predicted by
the theory, while females do not.
From a theoretical standpoint, Bratti, Checchi, and Filippin (2008) proposed a
model of student cooperation/competition in learning activities, showing that free
riding opportunities lead to an insufficient degree of cooperation between school-
mates, which in turn decreases the overall achievement of the group. According
to their analysis, a cooperative learning approach may successfully emerge when
the class is homogeneous in terms of students’ ability. In our study we consider
an experimental design and a theoretical model where the incentive scheme is ex-
ogenous but similarly to Bratti, Checchi, and Filippin (2008) we focus on student
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cooperation/competition in learning activities. Our theoretical model suggests that
in a competitive environment individual performance should be higher than in the
cooperative environment.
3 The Experimental Design
The experiment involved all the undergraduate students enrolled in the Introduc-
tory Econometrics course of the major in Management Studies at the University
of Bologna, in year 2010.2 The course lasted 10 weeks (a three-hour-lecture per
week). Students participating to the experiment had to undertake 5 tests whose
marks were translated into bonus points for the final exam. The bonus points for
the final exam were equal to the average mark the student obtained in the five tests.3
Tests have been scheduled every two weeks and each test consisted of five
multiple-choice questions to be answered in 50 minutes. Each test concerns all
topics taught in the course until the last lecture before the test.
Tests were computerized4, and were held in the computer laboratory of the
School of Economics of the University of Bologna. Desks were arranged so to
minimize the possibility for students to talk during the exams (see Figure A.1 in
Appendix).
The mark in each test consisted in an individual component, based on the num-
ber of correct answers in the test, and a number of extra points related to the treat-
ment and possibly to the performance of the partner.
Our study included two treatment conditions – characterized by a competitive
2The University of Bologna is considered the oldest University in Europe and counts on average
nearly 8000 enrolled students each academic year.
3Marks in the final exam range from 0 to 30. The exam is passed with a mark equal or above 18.
The bonus points ranged from 0 to nearly 4.
4The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007a)).
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and by a cooperative incentive scheme, respectively – and a control treatment. In all
treatments including the control, part of the incentive depended solely on individual
effort. Treatments differed in how tests two, three and four were performed, while
the first and the last test were identical across treatments. The first and the last tests
were taken individually by each student. In contrast, in the second, third and fourth
tests students in the two treatment conditions were randomly matched in couples at
the beginning of each test, and had the opportunity of exchanging messages with
their partner via a controlled chat program, running on their computer. In both
treatment conditions, the total score in tests 2, 3, and 4 of the test depended not
only on the student’s individual performance (i.e. the net score), but also on the
partner’s performance. Table 3.1 summarizes the treatments, which are described
in detail below.
Students were assigned to treatments between the first and the second test. Be-
fore starting tests 2, 3, and 4, students assigned to the two treatment conditions
were asked whether they wanted to use the chat or not to communicate with the
paired partner. This decision was taken simultaneously by all students. During the
test, a couple of students could use the chat program only if both students declared
to be willing to communicate, at the beginning of the test. If the two students chose
to communicate, per each of the questions of the test they could send only one
“signal” to indicate what the right answer was, and one short text message of up
to 180 characters. Interactions were anonymous, as students could not know the
identity of their partner. In the control treatment no interaction between students
was allowed.5
5Figure A.4 presents a screen-shot of the graphical interface of the program used for the tests On
the left-hand side of the screen students could read the question, and the multiple-choice answers. On
the top-right part of the screen they could send messages to their partner, while on the bottom-right
part of the screen they could read the messages possibly sent to them by the partner.
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In each test, the value pq of correct answers to each question q ranged between
0.3 and 1.2 points. Across all treatments, the number of points vki a student could
get by correctly answering the questions of test k was:
vki = s
k
i · I
(
ski ≥ 1.5
)
, ski =
5∑
q=1
pq,ki , k = 1, . . . 5
In each test, the maximum number of points v¯ was equal to 3. This is the indi-
vidual part of the mark in the test, i.e. the component which is common across all
treatments.
In the COMPETITIVE treatment, student i’s mark in a test was increased by 2
extra points if she performed strictly better than the partner. The k-th test’s mark
vˆki for student i under this incentive scheme is described in equation (1).
vˆki = v
k
i + 2 · I
(
ski > s
k
j
)
, k = 2, 3, 4 (1)
This provides an incentive for both matched students to compete.
Conversely in the COOPERATIVE treatment, student i’s mark in a test was in-
creased by 1 extra point if the partner’s performance was sufficiently good. The
k-th test’s mark vˆki for student i under this incentive scheme is presented in equa-
tion (2).
vˆki = v
k
i + I
(
skj ≥ 1.5
)
, k = 2, 3, 4 (2)
Finally, students in the CONTROL treatment received 1 extra point in tests 2, 3
and 4.6
6This is done so that the maximum number of bonus points per team is constant across treatments.
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Table 3.1: Summary of the treatments, in tests 2, 3 and 4
treatment extra points (rounds 2, 3, 4) messages available
CONTROL 1 no
COOPERATIVE I(skj ≥ 1.5) yes
COMPETITIVE 2 · I(ski > skj ) yes
Time-line of the experiment. The experiment started in February 2010, and
ended in July of the same year. In the first lecture of the course, on February
25th, the full set of instructions was distributed to students and each student had
two days to decide whether to take the partial exams or not. At this stage, students
were not explicitly informed that they were taking part in an experiment and only
at the very end of the course, participating students were asked to sign a consent
form authorizing the treatment of data collected during the partial exams.7
On March 1, during a standard class, students were asked to fill in a question-
naire collecting data about some personal characteristics (age, gender, familiarity
with computers, e-mail and chat programs, mother and father education). Question-
naire answers are used in the econometric analysis to control for individual-specific
characteristics.8
On March 22nd students took the first test. Notice that at this stage students
had not yet been assigned to treatments, so the grade in this first test can be used
as a measure of their performance before being exposed to the treatment. Students
received information about what treatment they had been assigned to only three
days later, on March 25th.9 In the same day, students were informed about their
7The experiment was authorized by the ethics committee of the the University of Bologna (Comi-
tato Bioetico per la Valutazione di Protocolli di Sperimentazione).
8An overview of the answers to the questionnaire is provided in Section 5, and a translation of the
questions is reported in Table A.2 in Appendix.
9Students taking part in our experiment were then randomly assigned to two groups of about
65 people each, because the computer lab can host only up to 80 students at a time. All students
assigned to the competitive treatment and half of those assigned to the control treatment were in the
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own result in the first test, and about the distribution of the first test score among
participants. In this way we tried to convey common knowledge of the distribution
of competences and ability in the population. Section 4 will show how this is
relevant from the theoretical point of view.
The remaining four tests were taken approximately every two weeks, in April
and May 2010 with the exception of the fifth which was administered one week
after the fourth.10 Student could benefit of the bonus points gained in the tests
only if they took the final exam in June or July 2010. On March 22, before the
experiment started, students were informed that the bonus points would expire after
the summer.
4 The Model
This section describes the main features of the model we use to derive theoretical
predictions and inform the experimental design. After briefly characterizing the
general features of the model, we illustrate its implications in terms of expected ef-
fort under the different incentive schemes. We first describe what happens without
competitive or cooperative incentives (BASELINE treatment). We then characterize
the optimal effort under incentives to cooperation and to competition and finally we
highlight the testable predictions of the model.
General features We assume that students’ abilities are in the interval θ ∈ [0, 1]
and are distributed according to a non-degenerate distribution function F (·). Stu-
first group, while all students in the cooperative treatment and the remaining students of the control
treatment were in the second group.
10This is made on purpose since the last test is taken by students individually and covers the last
contents of the program as well as some of the previous ones. Hence, it will reflect the effort exerted
in the previous stages.
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dents choose a level of effort ei ∈ [0, 1], which determines their performance in the
tests and in the final exam. The dis-utility from effort is c(ei). We further assume
that c(·) is independent on subjects’ ability θi, and that c′(·) > 0 and c′′(·) > 0.
The expected score in test k is a function of ability and effort and is given by
the following expression:
ski = ei · θi · v¯ (3)
The utility of each student is positively affected by the score and negatively
affected by the effort. We assume that students choose their level of effort two
times: the first time they choose ei,0 when the course starts, before the first test
and before the assignment to the treatments; later, after having been assigned to
treatments they choose the level of effort ei that determines their performance in
tests 2 to 5 and in the final exam. At this point, their expected utility is given by
3 components: the bonus points obtained in the four remaining tests to be taken
– which in the two treatment conditions is the outcome of the interaction with the
matched agent – the individual mark in the final exam11 and the cost of effort.
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the expected utility at the time in which ei
is chosen is:
E[Ui] =
1
5
5∑
k=2
∫ 1
0
vˆki (θi, ei, θj , ej) · f(θj)dθj + V¯ · ei · θi − c(ei) (4)
where V¯ is the maximum mark in the final exam.
Baseline treatment A student assigned to the baseline treatment does not interact
with any other student. As a consequence, considering the four tests and the final
11Remember that the bonus adds points on top of this mark.
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exam, the expected utility (4) simplifies in:
UBLi = V¯ · ei · θi +
1
5
· (4 · ei · θi · v¯) + 3
5
− c(ei) (5)
from this utility function we can derive the optimal effort exerted:
∂UBLi
∂ei
= (V¯ +
4
5
· v¯) · θi − c′(ei) (6)
Normalizing the quantity V + 45 · v¯ = 1, we get the baseline effort:
c′(eBLi ) = θi
that implies
∂eBLi (θi)
∂θi
> 0
i.e., we expect more able individuals to exert more effort in the baseline treatment
with respect to less able individuals and no variation over the optimal choices of
effort.
Competitive treatment To model student’s behavior under the two treatments
and to derive predictions, we look for the equilibrium in the bayesian-Nash games
where students have private information about their own type and a common knowl-
edge on the distribution of abilities in the population.
Under the competitive scheme, students get bonus points if their performance
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is better than the partner’s. Equation (7) describes the expected utility in this case.
U compi = V¯ · ei · θi +
1
5
[4 · ei · θi · v¯] + 3
5
· 2 · Pr(ei · θi > ej · θj)− c(ei) =
= V¯ · ei · θi + 1
5
[4 · ei · θi · v¯] + 6
5
·
∫ θi· eiej
0
f(θj)dθj − c(ei) =
= V¯ · ei · θi + 1
5
[4 · ei · θi · v¯] + 6
5
· F
(
θi · ei
ej
)
− c(ei)
(7)
where 6/5 ·F (θi ·ei/ej) is the expected number of additional points obtained in the
second, third, and fourth test in case the student outperforms his partner. Hence,
the expected utility can be expressed as:
ei(θi) ∈ argmax
ei
{
E[Ui] = V¯ eiθi +
1
5
[4eiθiv¯] +
6
5
∫
θj |θjej<θiei
f(θj)dθj − c(ei)
}
(8)
Under regularity assumption on the distribution of types in the population, it
can be shown that the first order conditions are12:
θi − c′(ei) + 6
5
f(Φj(ei))Φ
′(ei) = 0 (9)
where Φk is the mapping from the effort to the type (individual ability). Now, since
Φ′ = 1/e′, we have the following solution for the optimal effort in the competitive
treatment:
c′(ei) = θi +
6
5
f(θi) · 1
e′i
(10)
12In order to have a pure strategy Nash equilibria, the distribution function of types must be non-
degenerate and the mapping from type to effort must be continuous and increasing. The requirement
on the distribution of types is a plausible requirement, given the heterogeneity in the population while
the two on the mapping between type and effort can be proven to be true in our case. In the non-
heterogeneous case, that is when the distribution of types is degenerate, it can be easily shown that
no pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
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From this equation we see that the optimal effort exerted under this scheme is equal
or higher than the optimal level of effort eBLi in the control treatment. The mag-
nitude of the effect depends on the subject’s ability θi and on the shape of the
distribution F (·).
Cooperative treatment Under this scheme, each student has a clear incentive
to share her information (in tests 2, 3 and 4) and the mark depends also on the
partner’s effort.
In this case the expected utility becomes:
U coopi = V¯ · ei · θi +
1
5
· [ei · θi · v¯] +
+
1
5
∫ 1
0
3 · [v¯ · (ei · θi + ej · θj − ei · θi · ej · θj) +
+ I(ei · θi + ej · θj − ei · θi · ej · θj > 0.5)] · f(θj)dθj − c(ei)
(11)
The second term in equation (11) represents the points obtained form the fifth
test, where no interactions among student was allowed, while the third term repre-
sents the bonus obtained in tests 2, 3 and 4.
The assumption that information is shared by the students is crucial and implies
that the probability of knowing the answer is given by the common knowledge of
the couple. Thus, here the knowledge of the couple is the union of the knowledge
of the two members and the optimal effort is given by:
c′(ecoopi ) = θi −
3
5
· v¯ · θi
∫ 1
0
θj · ej · f(θj)dθj (12)
The second term in the right-hand side of equation (12) is always non-positive, and
its absolute value increases with θi. This shows that, since information is shared,
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each team member has an incentive to exploit the effort of the other lowering his
own contribution. As a consequence, under the cooperative treatment, team mem-
bers have an incentive to shrink their effort, and this detrimental effect of coopera-
tion on effort is stronger for students with higher ability (θi).
Testable predictions To sum up, our theoretical model predicts that, given the
ability θi, the effort exerted by student i in the three treatments is such that:
ecoopi ≤ eBLi ≤ ecompi
i.e., we expect that on average students randomized into the COOPERATIVE treat-
ment exert lower or equal effort than students randomized into the CONTROL treat-
ment whereas students randomized into the COMPETITIVE treatment should exert
more effort.13 Conversely, at time 1, all students have the same individual incen-
tives to increase effort and optimal effort depends only on their ability level, i.e.
ecoopi,0 = e
BL
i,0 = e
comp
i,0 = ei,0. Moreover, the model predicts that the detrimental
effect of the cooperative scheme is stronger for high ability individuals while the
same type of individuals should exert more effort with respect to the less able in-
dividuals in the baseline treatment. Note that our main testable predictions involve
the differential changes in effort across treatments and ability levels. Our design
allows to measure these changes, as discussed in more detail in section 5.1.
We also expect that students assigned to the cooperative treatment will use the
chat more frequently and will use it to exchange information. Conversely, students
assigned to the competitive treatment should use the chat less frequently and could
potentially use it for acts of sabotage, i.e. to suggest the wrong answers. We col-
13The ordering holds if the distribution of abilities is the same in the three treatments.
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lected data to check these aspects. Results of our inquiry are discussed in section
5.3.
5 Results
In this section we first discuss our choice of outcome measure, then present the data
and discuss the results on the effect of the incentives on information sharing and on
effort.
5.1 Measuring Effort
Our theoretical model predicts that for a given level of ability, there is a weak
ordering in the effort exerted by each student i, namely ecoopi ≤ eBLi ≤ ecompi . We
thus expect that on average students randomized into the COOPERATIVE treatment
exert lower or equal effort than students randomized into the CONTROL treatment
whereas students randomized into the COMPETITIVE treatment should exert more
effort.14
Equation (3) in our simple model describes the relationship between expected
student performance at each test and effort, namely si = θiei, where si is the net
score of individual i, θi is a measure of individual ability and ei is the effort exerted.
Taking logs and allowing for noise in the way in which effort generates perfor-
mance, we get
yi = ζi + i (13)
where yi ≡ log(si) is the log of the net score of individual i, ζi ≡ log(ei) is the log
of the effort exerted, while i = log(θi) + εi and E[i] = log(θi), i.e. we assume
14The ordering holds if the distribution of abilities is the same in the three treatments and this is
guaranteed by randomization.
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that only the idiosyncratic component ε averages to 0 for any i, while the error i
has a possibly non-zero mean equal to an individual specific constant.
Our experimental design provides an interesting way to measure effort under
weak assumptions. Recall that we observe students’ performance in similar tests
both before the assignment to the treatments (test 1) and after the exposure to the
treatments (test 5). Both these tests are taken individually under all treatments and
cover similar topics15. However, by construction, the performance in the first test
and the effort exerted to pass it cannot be affected by the treatments since both
performance and effort are pre-determined with respect to the assignment to the
different incentive schemes. Conversely, the performance in the last test should
reflect changes in effort induced by the treatment. Indeed, moving from equation
(13) and contrasting the performance in test 5 and 1, we have yi − y0 = ζi − ζi0 +
εi − εi0. It follows that E[yi − yi0] = E[ζi − ζi0] , i.e. by looking at the change in
the logarithm of performance between the first and last test, we measure the change
of the logarithm of effort net of the direct effect of any fixed individual specific
factor.
Recall that all our treatment conditions have a common individual incentive
to increase effort but differ in the incentives to compete or cooperate and only in
the baseline students can neither compete, nor cooperate. Following the theoretical
predictions of our simple model, we expect an increase in effort in all treatments
with respect to a set up where no individual incentives are granted. Our experiment
is not designed to estimate this common effect -none of our groups has no indi-
vidual incentives- but to capture the differential changes induced by the different
15The last test covers a larger set of arguments which includes also those covered by the first and
is more closely spaced over time with respect to the other tests.
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treatments. The testable prediction of our model involves the differential increase
in effort under the cooperative and competitive scheme with respect to the base-
line. This weak ordering holds also if we consider log(e), since the logarithm is a
monotonic transformation.
To test the theoretical predictions, we first contrast the distribution of effort
under the three schemes and check for heterogeneity in the treatment effect over
the effort distribution. We then assess the effect on the average change in log(e)
and run the following regression
E[ζi − ζi0] = β0 + β1Coop+ β2Comp (14)
where β0 represents the average change in log(e) under the baseline, β1 is the av-
erage differential change in log(e) under the cooperative scheme with respect to
the baseline, and β2 is the average differential change in log(e) under the compet-
itive scheme with respect to the baseline. The theory predicts β1 ≤ 0 and β2 ≥ 0.
There is an additional prediction that β0 = 0, i.e. no change in performance under
the baseline. However, our model does not allow for learning which may occur in
practice. Namely, after the first test the performance of the students in the baseline
improves because they are becoming more familiar with the types of tests and the
way the tests are performed in the laboratory. Allowing for learning will not affect
our theoretical predictions provided that learning is constant across treatments. If
learning occurs in practice, β0 > 0.
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5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Among the 145 students attending the course, 131 applied for participation into the
experiment. Our elaborations are based only on the records of the stayers, i.e. 114
students who participated to all 5 tests.
We exclude from the elaborations the records of 17 students who missed at least
one test: 10 students assigned to the control treatment (BASELINE in what follows),
2 students assigned to the COOPERATIVE treatment and 5 students assigned to the
COMPETITIVE treatment (see table A.1 in Appendix). We shall highlight that 6
of these students were late at the 3rd test and were thus excluded from that test.
The experimental program is run in z-Tree Fischbacher (2007b): when the test (the
experimental session) starts, additional subjects can participate only shutting down
and restarting the entire session. Students were informed that not being on time
for the test would result in being excluded from the test session. Out of these 17
students, 8 dropped out after the first test: all these students were assigned to the
baseline treatment after test 1. When we compare stayers and dropouts in the full
sample, we cannot reject the null that drop-outs had a worse performance in the
first test.16
Once we limit the analysis to the students who participated at all tests, the
samples are relatively balanced across treatments with respect to observed and pre-
determined characteristics: we do not detect differences in the distribution of the
score the first test (score 1) and the average score at previous exams (GPA) be-
16There are no significant differences between the subpopulation of excluded students and the
stayers in observable and pre-determined characteristics among the students who where assigned to
the COOPERATIVE treatment. We do not reject the null of equal means at 1% level -but we reject
at 5%- in the subpopulations for the other treatments: students who participated to all tests in the
BASELINE and in the COMPETITIVE treatment tend to be those who achieved a higher score in the
first test (0.7 points higher than the one for those who dropped out in the BASELINE group and 0.85
points higher than the one for those who dropped out in the COMPETITIVE treatment).
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tween any two treatments (BASELINE, COOPERATIVE, COMPETITIVE) at any con-
ventional level of confidence (see Table 5.1). Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix re-
port the empirical probability distribution of the pre-treatment variables (the score
in the first test, and the average mark in previous exams). Table 5.1 also reports
the mean value of several other individual characteristics, obtained from subjects’
answers to the questionnaire and p-values of tests aimed at detecting differences
in these characteristics across treatments.17 In general, the overall sample is well
balanced across treatments. There are some exceptions: the frequency of use of
e-mail is significantly higher in the BASELINE treatment than in the COMPETITIVE
and in the COOPERATIVE treatments. Significant differences emerge also in terms
of the education level achieved by the students’ fathers (but not mothers).
To detect the role of interactions effect between the treatments and the students’
ability, we consider several different proxies for student’s ability and include inter-
action terms in a simple regression. Our favorite proxy to control for student’s
ability is the average mark at previous exams: students who participated in the ex-
periment are third year students taking exams is in the last quarter of the third year;
therefore, their academic history can be a reliable proxy of their academic skills. In
line with the most recent empirical evidence from Italy (AlmaLaurea, 2009), also
in our sample females tend to perform significantly better than males in terms of
GPA (Females = 25.2, Males = 24.3, Rank-Sum Test = P 0.028). We say an
individual is a high ability individual if his/her score on the classification variable
is above the median for that variable in the sample.
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Table 5.2: Use of the chat
Treatment Acceptance of Av. num. Av. message
the chat of messages length
Cooperative 98% of subjects 3 (out of 5) 28 words
Competitive 70% of subjects 0.5 (out of 5) 11 words
5.3 Communication and treatments.
Students under both treatments’ schemes had two ways to communicate: they could
send text messages or hints18. Messages and hints were limited in two ways. On
the one hand students could not send any information useful to identify themselves
(under the threat of exclusion from the test); on the other hand, for each of the 5
questions asked in a test, a student can send and receive only one message of both
types.
Table 5.2 together with Table A.3 in the Appendix report descriptive statistics on
the use of chat by subjects. The figures suggest that almost everybody under the
COOPERATIVE treatment accepted it19, and that the average number of exchanged
messages is six times higher than in the COMPETITIVE treatment.
The chat tended to be used more frequently than the hint under both schemes.
The content of conversations suggests the chat has been actually used to exchange
information. Conversely, the chat was not actively used by students under the COM-
PETITIVE scheme: they declared to be willing to use the chat but only 0.5 messages
were exchanged on average. More importantly, students did not believe in the mes-
17We contrasted averages across treatments by means of linear and non linear regressions.
18The hint consisted in a simple message informing the receiver that the sender believes a certain
answer to be the right one. The sender can suggest a different answer with respect to the one actually
selected in the test.
19At the beginning of the exam the student must input the registration number and then choose if
she wants to use the chat or not.
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sages of the partner20. Indeed, in some cases the chat has been used to deceive the
partner (see Table 5.4, and Figure A.6 in Appendix for an illustrative example).
Table 5.3 reports descriptive statistics on the number of actions taken by stu-
dents under each treatment. Sending a text message or giving a hint are actions.
Under the COOPERATIVE scheme the average number of actions tend to increase
from the first test in couples (test 2) to the last (test 4), changing from nearly 5 to
above 6, and the correlation between the number of actions taken in different tests
is positive, between 0.34 and 0.53, and decreasing with the lag between tests. Some
students under the COOPERATIVE scheme used all the available actions (5 text mes-
sages and 5 hints) and the median number of action is between 6/7: students tended
to use at least one of the two available actions in each question of each test and
they often used both. Generally, the text message was sent before the hint, and the
time lag between the text message and the hint ranges between 1 and 5 minutes
in most questions and tests (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). Conversely, under
the COMPETITIVE scheme the median number of actions taken is always 0 and the
average number of actions remains relatively stable slightly above 1: students tend
to use both the chat and the hint for the same question and only once per test. They
also tend to send the text message and the hint almost simultaneously or to send
the hint before the text message (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). The correlation
between the number of actions taken in subsequent tests is weaker (between 0.17
and 0.36) and tends to increase with the lag between tests. The correlation between
the exerted effort and the number of actions is negligible under both schemes.
We consider data on the couples in each test and contrast answers of the mem-
20We do not provide descriptive statistics on the extent of sabotage because these statistics would
not be comparable across treatments. Indeed, given the low number of individuals that used the chat
under the competitive treatment, we will not get reliable statistics for that group.
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Table 5.3: Number of actions (i.e. use of chat and use of hints) by round and
treatment.
Cooperative
mean sd median min max
Test 2 5.12 3.36 6 0 10
Test 3 5.80 2.92 7 0 10
Test 4 6.37 2.91 6 0 10
Competitive
mean sd median min max
Test 2 1.47 2.48 0 0 8
Test 3 1 2.51 0 0 10
Test 4 1.67 2.24 0 0 8
Table 5.4: Proportion of cases in which the members of the couple give the same
answer.
Test 2 Test 3 Test 4
Cooperative 56.38% 77.26% 84.78%
Competitive 30.5% 52% 56.84%
Difference 25.88 25.26 27.94
bers: Table 5.4 shows that members of the couples under the COOPERATIVE scheme
tend to give the same answer much more frequently than their class mates under
the COMPETITIVE scheme. The difference is stable across tests and slightly higher
than 25%.
We interpret the observed pattern of information exchange across treatments as
a positive response to the incentives: students understood the different mechanisms
underlying the two different schemes and behaved accordingly as far as exchange
of information is concerned.
5.4 Treatment effects
Figure 5.1 depicts the empirical distribution of effort (i.e. log(net score 5) - log(net
score 1)) across treatments. The vertical blue line represents the median of the dis-
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tribution, the left hinge of the box indicates the 25th percentile, and the right hinge
of the box indicates the 75th percentile. Visual inspection suggests that under the
COOPERATIVE treatment, subjects perform more poorly respect to the BASELINE
treatment, while no sizable differences emerge between the COMPETITIVE and the
BASELINE treatments.
Figure 5.1: Box-plot showing the distribution of effort across treatments.
Wilcoxon tests do not reject the hypothesis that the distribution of effort is the
same across treatments. These tests are not appropriate if we want to establish an
ordering across all three treatments. Thus, we also perform a Jonckheere-Terpstra
test, a non-parametric test designed to detect alternatives of ordered class differ-
ences. This test does reject the hypothesis that effort is constant across treatments
versus the alternative hypothesis that effort is ordered across treatments according
to our main theoretical prediction ( ecoopi ≤ eBLi ≤ ecompi ) at 10%.
P-values of these tests are reported in Table 5.5, together with the mean level of
effort in each treatment condition.
It has been pointed out in Section 2 that according to the experimental literature,
a competitive environment may induce different effects on effort for females and
27
Table 5.5: Mean level of effort, by gender and treatment.
pooled males females
Mean effort
cooperative 0.500 0.377 0.628
baseline 0.583 0.452 0.677
competitive 0.570 0.680 0.459
Wilcoxon tests (p-values)
base. vs. coop. 0.313 0.135 0.948
base. vs. comp. 0.745 0.442 0.721
coop. vs. comp. 0.190 0.059∗ 0.713
Jonckheere-Terpstra tests (p-values)
0.088∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.624
Legend: One star, two stars, three stars for significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% level respec-
tively.
for males. Consistently with these works, we find that the picture indeed changes
when we split the sample by gender. Figure 5.2 reveals that the treatment effect
is substantially different for male and female subjects. The detrimental effect of
the COOPERATIVE treatment on effort with respect to the COMPETITIVE treatment
only emerges for males, whereas for females no clear treatment effect arises.
One-sided Wilcoxon tests confirms that males’ level of effort is significantly
lower in the COOPERATIVE treatment than in the COMPETITIVE treatment at 10%
level but no significant difference emerges with respect to the baseline. In contrast,
the same test does not reject the hypothesis of equal distribution of effort between
any two treatments for the female sample. These tests are not appropriate if we want
to establish an ordering across all three treatments. Thus we run the the Jonckheere-
Terpstra test for the subsamples of males and females: for the male sample, the test
rejects at 5% the null hypothesis that effort is not ordered across treatments against
the alternative hypothesis that effort is ordered according to what predicted by the
theory; no effect is detected for females. P-values of these tests are reported in
Table 5.5.
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Figure 5.2: Box-plot showing the distribution of effort across treatments, by gender.
Our theoretical model predicts heterogeneity in the effect of the incentives’
schemes on effort with respect to students’ ability, at least for the competitive treat-
ment. To control in a parsimonious way for individual ability, and for other individ-
ual characteristics, while assessing the effects of the treatments’ scheme on average
effort, we use linear regression models.
We run the analysis separately for males and females as previous results suggest
that they react differently to incentives.
Table 5.7 presents the benchmark results of two baseline specifications for
males and females: column (1) and (2) do not allow for heterogeneity in the treat-
ment effects with respect to students’ ability while in column (3) and (4) we include
interactions between treatments and the ability indicator based on the average mark
at previous exams. All regressions include controls for father education, risk aver-
sion and trust. The top panel of Table 5.7 reports coefficients estimates while the
bottom report p-values of both bilateral and unilateral tests: by specifying the di-
rection in which the null hypothesis of no effect is violated (as predicted by theory),
we increase the power of the t-test to detect significant deviations. As reference,
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Table 5.6: Power of the two-sided and one-sided test of mean comparison across
treatments and optimal size n∗ for two sided tests with equal group sizes and power
0.8 . Males and Females.
Null Hypothesis Males Females
Power n∗ Power n∗
2 sided 1 sided 2 sided 1 sided
Baseline vs Cooperative 0.08 0.12 658 0.06 0.08 3078
Baseline vs Competitive 0.25 0.35 84 0.25 0.36 101
Cooperative vs Competitive 0.07 0.11 879 0.16 0.25 161
we computed the power of a test to detect differences between any two treatments
for males and females separately using the descriptive statistics (mean, standard
deviations and sample size) of our sample and significance level α = 0.5.21 Table
5.6 shows that we have little power to detect differences between the baseline and
the cooperative treatment, while we have more power to detect differences between
the baseline and the competitive treatment for both genders, even all values are
quite low. In addition, the table reports the sample size required for a test to detect
difference of the size we observe with power 0.8 (assuming constant sample sizes
across groups): most of these sizes can be hardly met within a design structured as
ours.
Results in Table 5.7 confirm previous results on the differential effects across
treatments: there is evidence of a significant increase in effort under the competitive
treatment with respect to the baseline for males but not for females.22 The effect
is statistically distinct from zero at 10% and not-negative at 5%. When we control
for ability, we find that : (i) the positive incentive for males is higher for the low
ability individuals (still significantly non-negative at 10%) and decreases substan-
tially for high ability individuals; (ii) there is a negative and statistically significant
21The power of similar tests for the pooled sample is lower: the gender heterogeneity makes point
estimates of the average log(e) less precise.
22Since we include control variates and 9 students do not answer the questionnaire, the sample size
relevant for the regressions is 105 instead of 114.
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Table 5.7: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Treatment Effects: Benchmark
Specification. Males and Females.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No heterogeneity with ability Heterogeneity with ability
Variables Males Females Males Females
Constant 0.386** 0.652*** 0.239 0.740**
[0.174] [0.178] [0.262] [0.294]
Cooperative -0.125 -0.156 0.100 -0.135
[0.178] [0.219] [0.263] [0.382]
Competitive 0.331* -0.235 0.492* -0.363
[0.189] [0.211] [0.272] [0.359]
Coop · High Ability -0.486 -0.117
[0.401] [0.475]
Comp · High ability -0.266 0.080
[0.398] [0.449]
High ability 0.127 0.073
[0.280] [0.319]
High parental education -0.249 -0.155 -0.317* -0.219
[0.151] [0.185] [0.173] [0.210]
Frequent use of e-mail 0.139 -0.224
[0.161] [0.206]
Risk averse 0.290* 0.221 0.290* 0.280
[0.147] [0.173] [0.150] [0.198]
Truster (1) 0.105 0.084 0.136 0.114
[0.155] [0.194] [0.164] [0.213]
Observations 50 55 50 55
R2 0.237 0.066 0.311 0.157
P-values for the null of no effect against bilateral or unilateral H1
(R)≡ H1: β > 0; (L) ≡ H1: β < 0
Competitive
1 sided (R) 0.039∗∗ 0.867 0.035∗∗ 0.844
2 sided 0.089∗ 0.266 0.071∗ 0.312
Cooperative
1 sided (L) 0.240 0.238 0.649 0.362
2 sided 0.480 0.476 0.703 0.724
Competitive for high ability
1 sided (R) 0.221 0.837
2 sided 0.441 0.326
Cooperative for high ability
1 sided (L) 0.092∗ 0.186
2 sided 0.184 0.373
High parental education is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the highest qualification of
at least one of the parents of the individual is above high school and 0 otherwise. Risk averse is
a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the answer of the individual on the risk aversion scale is
above 6 and 0 otherwise. Truster (1) is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the answer of the
individual on the trust 1 scale is above 6 and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in brackets. Three stars,
two stars and one star for significant effect at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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(at 10%) detrimental effect of the cooperative treatment for high ability individuals
only. However, the difference in effects of incentives between ability groups is not
significant in our sample for the competitive case nor for the cooperative case. The
magnitude of the effect ranges from 33% to 49% which is a strong increment of
the exerted effort. Notice that this is in line with the findings of Angrist and Lavy
(2009) who use monetary incentives based on the achievement of a specified score
target.
For females, no statistically significant effect can be detected. The pattern of
the effect of competitive incentives on effort for females is similar to the one de-
tected for males but in the opposite direction: the point estimate of the effect is
negative and, when we control for ability, point estimates of the effect of compet-
itive incentives for females are negative for both low and high ability individuals
but less so for high ability individuals.
We detect a significant increase in effort also in the baseline: we attribute this
to the fact that students become more familiar with the instruments used for the test
(learning). Students’ ability does not play any role in determining the increase in
effort in the baseline. Few regressors are relevant in determining changes in stu-
dents effort: risk aversion and parental background attract significant coefficients
in some specifications, suggesting that individuals who are risk averse tend on av-
erage to increase effort, while males with higher socio-economic background (here
proxied by highly educated parents) tend to decrease effort, other things equal.
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6 Conclusions
Our study investigates how two alternative incentive schemes affect students’ effort,
both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view. To test the theoretical
predictions, we run a field experiment in an undergraduate course at the University
of Bologna (Italy). We randomly assign students to either a tournament, where cou-
pled students compete to get the reward, a cooperative scheme where information
sharing is allowed, or a control treatment in which students can neither compete,
nor cooperate. Differently from previous studies, none of our treatments involves
pecuniary incentives but consists in extra points for their final grade. By doing so,
we provide incentives to students in ”the same currency” in which they are usu-
ally rewarded. In this sense, our approach is closer to the literature of personnel
economics where workers may receive a salary according to some schedule (based
on relative or absolute performance). Hence, we build a bridge between the lit-
erature in education economics and personnel economics, showing how dynamics
observed in a labor environments arise also in school environments.
The field-experiment data we collected confirm the theoretical predictions: we
observe a weak ordering between the effort exerted by students under the different
treatments with students in the competitive treatment exerting on average more
effort with respect to students in the baseline and in the cooperative treatment.
We break down our results by gender and show that a significant difference
emerges: only males react to incentives to compete while we cannot detect sig-
nificant effect for females. Cooperation seems not to foster effort exertion and no
gender effect emerges. In contrast with theoretical predictions we find that stu-
dents’ ability plays little role in determining the effectiveness of the incentives.
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Our experimental results suggest that non-pecuniary incentives based on com-
petition have the potential to increase students’ effort as pecuniary incentives do
(see Blimpo 2010) but at a much lower financial cost. In our case competition
proves to work on males which is line with findings in several other contexts (see
for example Gneezy and Rustichini 2004 and Niederle and Vesterlund 2010) where
it has been shown that males are more prone to compete with respect to females.
The estimated increase in effort induced for males in the competitive treatment
ranges from 33% to 49%, meaning that, for example, if a student in the baseline
spends 3 afternoons in preparing the test (roughly 10 hours), a student under the
competitive scheme will spend one more afternoon. Moreover, highlighting the
different effect of incentives to compete depending on gender, we complement the
results in Angrist and Lavy (2009) who show that monetary incentives based on
absolute performance are more effective for females.
Our study represents a first exploration of the effects of non-monetary incen-
tives on students’ performance and effort. It would be interesting to extend the
inquiry to different samples, to verify whether our result holds for students with
different majors (such as literature of philosophy), who are probably less trained to
optimization, and for younger students at high school and middle-high school.
34
A Appendix
A.1 Laboratory
Figure A.1: The laboratory arrangement
A.2 Additional tables
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive Statistics- Stayers
Predetermined controls
assigned stayers score 1 exams’ avg score 5
Baseline (control) 47 37 1.80 (0.81) 24.76 (1.8) 2.91 (0.24)
Cooperative 42 41 1.92 (0.84) 24.88 (2.3) 2.80 (0.50)
Competitive 41 36 1.69 (0.74) 24.83 (1.6) 2.69 (0.53)
Full sample 130 114 1.81 (0.80) 24.83 (1.9) 2.80 (0.45)
Score 1: score at the first mock exam. Score 5: score at the last mock exam. Exams’ avg: average
score at previous exams. Stayers: students who participated to 5 experimental sessions.
In Table A.2, we report the precise definition of questionnaire data used in the
analysis.
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Table A.2: Description of questionnaire data.
Variable Corresponding question Range Coding
gender gender 0, 1 1 = male
age age 0-100 age in years
freq. mail how frequently do you check your e-
mail?
1-5 1=“more than once per day”
2=“at least once per day”
freq. pc how frequently do you use the pc to
study/work?
1-5 3= “at least once per week”
4=“less than once per week”
freq. chat how frequently do you exchange text
messages via chat (msn, facebook,
google talk, skype, etc.)?
1-5 5=“Never”
father edu. please, indicate the education level
achieved by your father
1-5 1=“junior high school”
2=“high school”
mother edu. please, indicate the education level
achieved by your mother
1-5 3=“bachelor”
4=“master”
5=“Ph.D.”
risk aversion I would describe myself as a risk-
averse person.
1-10 1=“fully agree”
10=“fully disagree”
trust 1 Do you think that most people try to
take advantage of you if they got a
chance or would they try to be fair?
1-10 1=“people would try to take
advantage”
10=“people would try to be
fair”
trust 2 Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people?
1-10 1=“you can never be too
careful”
10=“most people can be
trusted”
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics -mean, [median] and (standard deviation)- on lag
between the use of chat and use of hints, by treatment and round. Questions 1-5
Lag & proportion of user of both chat and hint (seconds). Test 2.
Treatment Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5
Cooperative 107.6 [21.7] 322.8 [252.2] 58.6 [6.3] 151.0 [114.1] 54.2 [6.4]
(449.0) (378.3) (565.9) (513.5) (495.6)
Users (count) 14 12 11 13 16
Users (%) 35.0% 30.0% 27.5% 32.5% 40.0%
Competitive 80.6 [54.1] -123.3 [-123.3] 130.4 [23.9] 13.3 [13.3] 25.3 [16.9]
(67.9) (131.1) (1113.5) ( n.a. ) (21.3)
Users (count) 3 2 3 1 3
Users (%) 8.8% 5.9% 8.8% 2.3% 8.8%
Lag & proportion of user of both chat and hint (seconds). Test 3.
Treatment Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5
Cooperative 492.5 [374.8] 496.2 [368.1] -56.0 [-3.2] 167.6 [71.7] 76.4 [5.2]
(693.1) (577.4) (423.0) (427.3) (303.5 )
Users (count) 14 16 14 17 15
Users (%) 35.0% 40.0% 35.0% 42.5% 37.5%
Competitive 73.8 [7.6] -164.2 [-164.2] 720.1 [720.1] -194.0 [165.4] 97.0 [97.0]
(131.3) (951.9) (223.6) (380.5) (123.7)
Users (count) 3 2 2 4 2
Users (%) 8.8% 5.9% 5.9% 11.7% 5.9%
Lag & proportion of user of both chat and hint (seconds). Test 4.
Treatment Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5
Cooperative 146.9 [55.9] 119.8 [20.8] -15.8 [-3.3] 169.7 [40.8] 95.0 [4.1]
(482.1) (342.8) (522.4) (355.0) ( 240.2)
Users (count) 14 17 17 17 22
Users (%) 35.0% 42.5% 42.5% 42.5% 55.0%
Competitive 194.3 [12.3] 8.5 [8.5] 180.1 [2.1] 458.8 [72.6] 322.3 [322.2]
(365.8) (n.a.) (314.1) (721.4) (449.4)
Users (count) 4 1 3 3 2
Users (%) 11.7% 2.9% 8.8% 8.8% 5.9%
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A.3 Additional figures
Figure A.2: Empirical probability distribution of score 1 by treatment
38
Figure A.3: Empirical probability distribution of average score at previous exams
by treatment
39
Figure A.4: Screen-shot of the graphical interface for partial exams.
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A.4 Examples of chat messages
Figure A.5: Example of use of the chat under the cooperative scheme
A: Come on! Tell me which answers do you need. If you don’t get 1.5
points, we will lose the bonus.
B: In my opinion the right one is the 2nd
A: OK! I trust you
Figure A.6: Example of use of the chat under the competitive scheme
A: In this case the 4th is the best answer
B (replies): Why do you pass me this solution? Are you trying to
screw me?
C: I know that you are going to pass me the wrong answers.
D: I’m not sure...probably the right answer is the 1st [ she choses the
3rd ]
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